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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The state appeals from the district court's appellate order reversing
Joseph Rockstahl's misdemeanor convictions for exhibition of a deadly weapon
and disturbing the peace.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Rockstahl confronted construction workers at a site near his house with a
gun.

(R., pp. 10-13.)

The state charged him with three misdemeanors for

exhibiting a deadly weapon, aiming a firearm at others, and disturbing the peace,
by filing a complaint on November 23, 2012. (R., p. 9.) Rockstahl entered a pro

se notice of appearance. (R., p. 16.) The state filed a request for discovery. (R.,
p. 27.) A few days after Rockstahl's pro se appearance Daniel Brown of the
Fuller Law Offices entered an appearance as Rockstahl's attorney. (R., p. 28.)
Brown filed a motion to dismiss, asserting self defense and defense of
others, and scheduled the motion for hearing. (R., pp. 36-54.) The magistrate
denied the motion.

(R., p. 55.)

Shortly thereafter, on March 21, 2013, the

magistrate scheduled a pre-trial conference for May 17, 2013, and a jury trial for
May 30 and 31, 2013.

(R., pp. 56-57.) The pre-trial order also required that

discovery be completed and that the parties submit jury instructions and
exchange witness and exhibit lists prior to the pre-trial conference. (R., p. 56.)
On May 15, 2013, the Fuller Law Offices filed an Ex Parte Motion to
Withdraw its representation of Rockstahl.

(R., pp. 59-60.)

The basis for the

motion was that there had been "a total breakdown in the attorney/client
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relationship" because, in a March 28, 2013, letter, Rockstahl had "terminated the
services" of the Fuller Law Offices and indicated an intention to hire Keith Roark
to represent him. (R., pp. 61-62.)
The magistrate addressed the motion to withdraw at the scheduled May
17 pre-trial conference.

(5/17/13 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 7-13. 1 )

The magistrate asked

Brown why he had waited two months after being notified that his services were
terminated before filing the motion to withdraw.

(5/17/13 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 21-23.)

Brown represented that he believed Roark would file a substitution. (5/17/13 Tr.,
p. 2, L. 24 - p. 3, L. 6.) Brown also stated that "should the court be willing to
(5/17/13 Tr., p. 3, Ls. 13-15.)

continue, we'd waive speedy trial."

After

consulting with Brown, Roark, and the prosecutor about potential future trial
dates, the magistrate concluded that setting over the trial until Roark would be
available would be "a denial of justice." (5/17/13 Tr., p. 3, L. 16 - p. 5, L. 12.)
The magistrate then denied the motion to withdraw based on its timing. (5/17/13
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 17-24.)
The magistrate also instructed the defense to present its proposed jury
instructions and witness list by close of business the following Monday. (5/17/13
Tr., p. 20, Ls. 4-16 (giving a week); p. 11, L. 15-p. 12, L. 1 (shortening the time
after moving the trial to within six months of the initial appearance).) The state
disclosed its list, which included six witnesses.

(R., pp. 65-66.)

Rockstahl

asserted there would be "at least seven" witnesses called at trial. (5/17/13 Tr., p.
11, Ls. 21-23.)

The transcripts are included in the record before this Court as an exhibit labeled
"CD Transcription Friday May 17, 2013, Filed July 15, 2013."
1
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Rockstahl filed his requested jury instructions and witness and exhibit list
on May 20, 2013, as instructed. (R., pp. 77-101.) It listed 20 witnesses. (R., pp.
99-101.) Rockstahl then moved to continue the trial on the basis that "three or
more" of his listed witnesses were "out of town and unavailable." (R., pp. 10708.)

The magistrate denied the new continuance request, and also excluded

"character witnesses" (but not "fact witnesses") as a sanction for failing to
respond to the state's discovery request and failing to comply with the court's
scheduling order, reasoning that the state would be prejudiced because it could
not investigate or gather responding evidence prior to trial.

(R., pp. 113-14;

5/23/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 7 - p. 15, L. 20.)
The case proceeded to jury trial, resulting in an acquittal for aiming a
firearm but convictions for exhibition of a deadly weapon and disorderly conduct.
(R., pp. 181-88.) After sentencing Rockstahl appealed to the district court. (R.,
pp. 297-98, 300-01, 309.) The district court reversed, finding a violation of the
right to counsel of defendant's choice. (R., pp. 377-86.) The state filed a timely
notice of appeal. (R., pp. 403-05.)

3

ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err because the magistrate did not deny Rockstahl his
right to counsel of choice by refusing to continue the trial to a date available for
that counsel?
2.
Did the district court err in finding an abuse of discretion for excluding the
defense's character witnesses for a discovery violation?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred Because The Magistrate Did Not Deny Rockstahl His
Right To Counsel Of Choice By Refusing To Continue The Trial To A Date
Available For That Counsel
A.

Introduction
The magistrate specifically recognized Rockstahl's right to counsel of his

own choice, but denied Rockstahl's request for a two month continuance to
secure the services of Mr. Roark. (5/17/13 Tr., p. 2, Ls. 14-18; p. 5, L. 8-24.)
The district court on intermediate appeal concluded: "Denial of the motion to
withdraw, denial of a continuance, and the order for counsel and the Defendant
to work together denied the Defendant of his right to counsel of his choice (which
is structural error) as well as his due process rights and right to effective
assistance of counsel." (R., p. 382.) The record, however, does not support the
district court's conclusion.

Rather, the district court applied an incorrect legal

standard when it held that a continuance to effectuate the right to counsel of
choice had to be given in this case.

B.

Standard Of Review
"The decision to grant or deny a continuance is vested in the sound

discretion of the trial court." Hall v. State, 156 Idaho 125,131,320 P.3d 1284,
1290 (Ct. App. 2014). On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its
intermediate appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district
court's decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to
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it on appeal." Sorley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176,233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010);
see also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P .3d 758 (2008).

C.

Application Of The Correct Legal Standard To The Facts Of This Case
Shows The District Court Erred When It Concluded The Magistrate
Violated Rockstahl's Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel Of Choice
"[T]he denial of a motion for continuance is an abuse of discretion only if

the defendant can show his substantial rights have been prejudiced." State v.
Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 567, 199 P.3d 123, 142 (2008). Of course Rockstahl had
the right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, "an element"
of which is "the right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to
choose who will represent him." United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140,
144 (2006). Such right, however, is not unlimited.

!st at

151 ("Nothing we have

said today casts doubt or places any qualification upon our previous holdings that
limit the right to counsel of choice .... "). Such limitations include "mundane casemanagement considerations" including when "a trial judge schedules a trial to
begin on a particular date and defendant's counsel is already committed for other
trials until some time thereafter."

!st at

155 (Alita, J. dissenting); see also id. at

151-52 ("We have recognized a court's wide latitude in balancing the right to
counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar").

Thus, "only an

unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a
justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel."
Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1983) (internal quotations omitted).
It is clear that Rockstahl's choice of counsel was Keith Roark. (R., p. 62;
5/17/13 Tr., p. 2, L. 24 - p. 3, L. 6.) It is equally clear, however, that substituting
6

Mr. Roark as counsel would have required setting the trial over until the following
August, a delay of over two months. (5/17/13 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 2-5; p. 4, L. 25 - p. 5,
L. 7; see also R., p. 219 (post-trial affidavit of Rockstahl).)

In denying the

continuance to secure Mr. Roark's representation the magistrate considered that
this crime was a misdemeanor; the alleged crime occurred almost a year earlier;
the motion to withdraw was filed just before the pre-trial conference rather than
two months earlier when Rockstahl first announced his decision to hire Mr.
Roark; and the effect of the delay on the victims. (5/17/13 Tr., p. 4, Ls. 10-11; p.
5, Ls. 8-22.)

The record shows that the magistrate's ruling denying the

requested continuance 2 to secure representation by chosen counsel was neither
"unreasoning" nor "arbitrary," and therefore did not violate Rockstahl's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel of his own choosing.
The district court on intermediate appeal did not apply the "unreasoning
and arbitrary" legal standard articulated by the Supreme Court of the United
States. Indeed, at no point in its opinion does the district court recognize that the
right to choice of counsel is not absolute such that it does not require granting a
requested continuance. (R., pp. 380-82.) The district court's analysis focuses on
factors that are irrelevant to the legal standard, such as whether the delay in
seeking a continuance was the personal fault of the defendant and whether it

The state does not contend on appeal that the request was itself unreasonable.
An unreasonable request would also be grounds for denying a continuance that
would not violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. Slappy, 461
U.S. at 11-12.
2
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was reasonable to want to be represented by Mr. Roark.3

(R., p. 381.)

The

district court gives minimal, if any, consideration of the magistrate's stated
grounds for not continuing the trial. (R., pp. 381-82.)
The magistrate articulated specific reasons for denying a continuance so
Rockstahl could secure representation by Mr. Roark.

The district court largely

ignored these stated reasons, merely substituted its own judgment, and failed to
apply the correct legal standard.

Because application of the correct legal

standard shows that the magistrate court was within its "wide latitude of
balancing the right to counsel of choice ... against the demands of its calendar,"
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152, the district court erred by reversing.

II.
The District Court Erred In Finding An Abuse Of Discretion For Excluding The
Defense's Character Witnesses For A Discovery Violation

A

Introduction
The state filed a request for discovery, including a request for disclosure of

witnesses, on November 29, 2012. (R., p. 27.) Rockstahl never responded to
this discovery request.

(See generally R.)

The magistrate court ordered the

parties to provide witness lists prior to the pre-trial conference.

(R., p. 56.)

Rockstahl failed to provide a witness list prior to the pre-trial conference. (See
Generally R.) At the pre-trial conference Rockstahl indicated intent to call "at
least seven" unnamed witnesses.

(5/17/13 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 21-23.) The district

court ordered Rockstahl to submit a witness list the next working day. (5/17 /13

This last factor is antithetical to the applicable standard. A defendant who
wishes to be represented by the worst lawyer in the state has the same right to
choose his counsel as a defendant arguably making a better choice.

3
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Tr., p. 11, L. 15 - p. 12, L. 1.) Rockstahl submitted a list of 20 witnesses on May
20, 2013. (R., pp. 99-100.) The trial started May 23, 2013. (R., p. 182.)
The day after filing his witness list Rockstahl moved to continue the trial on
the basis that "three or more" unnamed witnesses were "out of town and
unavailable."

(R., pp. 107-08.)

The magistrate denied the new continuance

request, and also excluded "character witnesses" (but not "fact witnesses") as a
sanction for failing to respond to the state's discovery request and failing to
comply with the court's scheduling order, reasoning that the prosecution would
be prejudiced because it could not gather responsive evidence prior to trial. (R.,
pp. 113-14; 5/23/13 Tr., p. 6, L. 7 - p. 15, L. 20.)
The district court concluded the witness disclosure "complied with the
Court's oral order at the pre-trial" and that exclusion of some of the defense
witnesses was "an abuse of discretion" because the failure to disclose witnesses
arose from the same difficulty obtaining counsel of choice, and therefore a
continuance should have been granted to resolve this problem as well. (R., pp.
383-84.) The district court's reliance on its erroneous ruling regarding choice of
counsel taints this decision as well. Reviewed on its own merits, the sanction for
Rockstahl's discovery violation was within the scope of the lower court's
discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal, this Court reviews the record to determine if the finding of a

discovery violation is supported by substantial and competent evidence. State v.
Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 207-208, 899 P.2d 416, 420-421 (1995).
9

However,

"[w]hether to impose a sanction for a discovery violation, and the choice of an
appropriate sanction, are within the discretion of the trial court."

State v.

Huntsman, 146 Idaho 580, 586, 199 P.3d 155, 161 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing State
v. Allen, 145 Idaho 183, 185, 177 P.3d 397, 399 (Ct. App. 2008)). See also State
v. Anderson, 145 Idaho 99, 104, 175 P.3d 788, 793 (2008). "[T]he trial court's
exercise of that discretion is beyond the purview of a reviewing court unless it
has been clearly abused." State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 208, 899 P.2d 416,
421 (1995) (citing State v. Buss, 98 Idaho 173, 174, 560 P.2d 495,496 (1977)).
On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on
appeal." Berley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010); see
also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008).

C.

The District Court Erred By Finding An Abuse Of Discretion In The
Discovery Sanction
Although a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to

present evidence, defense witnesses may be excluded either for a willful or
deliberate late disclosure, even without prejudice, or upon balancing the
defendant's right to a fair trial against the state's prejudice from the lateness of
the disclosure. State v. Martinez, 137 Idaho 804, 806-07, 53 P.3d 1223, 1225-26
(Ct. App. 2002). In this case the magistrate found prejudice to the state from the
late disclosure. Specifically, the state was prejudiced in its inability to even
investigate whether evidence to rebut or otherwise respond to Rockstahl's
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character witnesses might be available.

However, because the state was not

prejudiced by the late disclosure of fact witnesses such witnesses were allowed
to testify. The magistrate applied the correct legal standard and reached a result
within the scope of its discretion.
The district court, on the other hand, merely concluded that granting a
continuance so Mr. Roark could have represented Rockstahl would have solved
this problem as well. (R., p. 383.) As noted above, this analysis was error and
does not provide an independent ground for finding the discovery sanction to be
an abuse of discretion.
The only other bases for the district court's conclusion were that "trial
counsel did not have the right or obligation to conduct discovery after his
discharge," the defense complied with the oral order at the pre-trial conference to
provide a witness list, and that character evidence is admissible. (R., pp. 38285.) None of these bases supports finding an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.
First, the district court was just flat wrong when it held that a party to
litigation may avoid his discovery obligations by surreptitiously firing his counsel.
"No attorney may withdraw as an attorney of record for any defendant in any
criminal action without first obtaining leave and order of the court upon notice to
the prosecuting attorney and the defendant .... " I.C.R. 44.1. Fuller Law Offices
were legally attorney of record at all relevant times, and the off-the-record "firing"
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did not relieve either the attorneys or the defendant of their discovery (or any
other) obligations in the case. 4
Second, the district court correctly concluded that Rockstahl complied with
the magistrate's oral order to provide a witness list, as stated at the pre-trial
conference.

This is not relevant.

The record clearly shows that Rockstahl

provided no response whatsoever to the state's discovery request and did not
comply with the court's pre-trial scheduling order. His compliance with the oral
order to provide a witness list did nothing to alleviate the prejudice of his untimely
disclosed character witnesses.
Finally, the district court noted that character evidence is often admissible,
but ultimately left the question of admission to be addressed on remand.
Although inadmissibility would be an alternate basis for excluding the evidence,
and was so argued by the prosecutor, the record shows that the evidence was
excluded as a sanction.

That the district court could only determine that the

evidence might be admissible weighs in favor of the sanctions, however,
because Rockstahl failed to show that this evidence was necessary for a fair trial.
The magistrate found that Rockstahl's discovery violation was prejudicial
to the prosecution in relation to character evidence but not factual evidence and,
after weighing that prejudice against the defendant's right to a fair trial, excluded
the former but admitted the latter.

The magistrate therefore applied the correct

The state also notes that it filed its discovery request about four months before
Rockstahl "fired" Fuller Law Offices. (R., pp. 27 (state's discovery request filed
November 29, 2012), 62 (Rockstahl "terminated the services" of Fuller Law
Offices on March 28, 2013).) The district court did not determine there was no
duty to answer discovery during that time frame.
4
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legal standards and reasonably exercised its discretion. The district court did not
apply the correct legal standards, and therefore erred in reversing on
intermediate appeal.

CONCLUSION

The state requests this Court to vacate the district court's opinion on
appeal and reinstate the judgment of the magistrate court.

DATED this 13th day of April, 201.5.
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